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URRARIES
THE STATE AND LOW INCOME COMMUNITIES
IN A PLANNED INDUSTRIAL CITY:
TWO CASE-STUDIES FROM THE
CIUDAD GUAYANA EXPERIENCE
by
Marisela Montoliu Mufioz
The thesis presents two case-studies that illustrate
how a development corporation (the CORPORACION VENEZOLANA DE
GUAYANA, CVG, from Ciudad Guayana, Venezuela) approaches, and
intervenes in low-income communities in Ciudad Guayana. The
thesis addresses issues such as: (a) The way the ideology
imbedded in the Guayana Program, started in the early sixties,
still keeps shaping the types of decisions assumed by the CVG;
(b) how CVG's organizational structure and administrative
style are reflected in, and affect CVG interventions in low-
income communities, and (c) how CVG conceives the role of
community organization and participation within the process of
design and implementation of its programs.
The first case-study is the process of relocation of
the barrio "Colinas de Unare," located in a supposedly
critical area close to the "modern" center of Ciudad Guayana;
the process began to take place in April, 1981. The second
case-study is an on-going program of training on artisan
production given by a CVG team to women in the barrios of
Ciudad Guayana since the early sixties. Research on the
affected communities' views of the programs ought to be
pursued in the future, to complement this study, which is
mostly based on institutional reports and interviews.
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INTRODUCTION
The present paper attempts to identify, through two
case-studies, the main assumptions, objectives and metho-
dologies that underlie or are utilized by the State in its
current interventions in income communities in Ciudad Guaya-
na, Venezuela.
The city, the agency that represents the State in it,
and the affected communities present particular characteris-
tics that have shaped the way in which those interventions are
given. In the first place, the city, Ciudad Guayana, arose as
a planned growth center in a remote region of Venezuela,
during a period in which "developmentalism", the ideal of
economic growth, and modernization, were the concepts leading
government actions. In the second place, the institution
representing the State, the Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana,
is a corporate entity, practically omnipotent in Ciudad Guaya-
na, whose main goal was to realize the developmentalist i-
deals, partly through the creation of a "city-beauty". In the
third place, there were the low income communities, already
existing in "the site" when Ciudad Guayana was just an idea in
the minds of the planners, and rapidly growing afterwards, as
an effect of the Guayana Program itself. They did not fit
into the planners expectations, and were considered to be in
conflict with the latter's goals. Though this combination of
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actors and setting, as we have said, generated state interven-
tions with very characteristic assumptions and objectives, it
might be said that the conclusions related to these case-
studies could be applied to State interventions in low income
communities in other dependent-capitalist urban settings, were
simmilar ideologies and assumptions could exist, possibly in
more subtile ways.
The two selected case-studies differ from each other in
their time scope and circumstances. The first of them is
the case of a quick process of relocation of a barrio growing
in a supposedly critical area of the "modern" city (starting
April, 1981); the second is an on-going program in artisan
production for housewives in the barrios, which has been
carried on continuously since the early 1960's, as a part of
the tasks of the Division of Social and Cultural Development
of the CVG. This contrast will allow us to observe how the
institution realize its goals under diverse types of pres-
sures.
All the information used to develop the case-studies
comes from the CVG itself. Part of it, specially in the case
of the barrio relocation, consisted of internal CVG reports
sent by the CVG people working in the barrio, and by people
coordinating the program to higher level officials. The rest
was collected through interviews to CVG officials in Ciudad
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Guayana, done in February of 1983. Due to the fact of relying
on a single--and particularly involved--source of information,
and even though we have tried to isolate the underlying
assumptions, biases and ommisions, this analysis might be
ignoring issues and data that would have been perceivable or
collectable only through direct contact with the community.
Additional research would be necessary to develop a more
comprehensive picture of the actual circumstances under which
the programs are taking place.
The paper begins by providing a brief background on the
history of the Guayana Program, of which Ciudad Guayana was a
part, and the ideology and assumptions underlying it.
Secondly, it goes on to describe the goals, organizational
structure and planning/administrative style of the State
agency, highlighting the ways in which these elements were
adjusted to the assumptions and ideology underlying the
program as a whole. Followingly, the two case-studies are
described; a "dramatistic", story-approach was chosen, since
it would help visualize the actual sequence and complexity of
the events involved in the real process. Finally, some
conclussions about the implications of CVG interventions are
drawn up, and some considerations are made about the need for
further research.
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I.- THE HISTORY OF THE GUAYANA PROGRAM: IMPLICATIONS
FOR CURRENT INTERVENTIONS
The objective of this chapter is to present a histori-
cal framework for the understanding of the two case-studies.
Emphasis will be given to (a) the ideological factors under-
lying the program of Guayana, and (b) the failures of the
development strategy and the initial planning process, which
generated both the problems that the Corporation has to face
today, and a set of constraints for its current actions.
1.1. The ideal of "growth" and "modernization" and the
new city
It was during the early 1950's, still under the period
of dictatorship of Marcos Perez Jim6nez, when the first moves
towards the development of the area of Guayana were done. Two
American companies, Bethlehem and U.S.Steel, under concessions
given by the Venezuelan government, began to exploit two
important iron ore deposits--El Pao and Cerro Bolivar--. At
the same time, the government, through its national develop-
ment corporation (Corporacidn Venezolana de Fomento, CVF)
started planning the development of a steel mill and two
hydroelectric dams near the confluence of the Orinoco and the
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Caroni rivers. These projects were not, then, part of any
wholly regional development attempt. They were just means for
the exploitation of the extraordinary natural resources of the
area, in a relatively disintegrated way, functioning as an
enclave, and reverting any possible profit back into the
national and international economic centers. The possibility
of finding a job in the initial stages of the construction,
and in the mines, began to attract the population from the
surrounding, depressed areas into the small towns of San Fdlix
and Matanzas (1).
At the begining of the 1960's, after the overthrow of
Perez Jim~nez and a short ruling of a transitional Junta, a
new democratic-populist government came into power after elec-
tions, bringing a consequent change in the approach to natio-
nal development, and to the case of Guayana. The new go-
vernment viewed economic growth and general "modernization"
as a basic condition for the improvement of the socioeconomic
situation of the population. Thus, together with some shy
redistributive measures as the agrarian reform (1960), it
decided to undertake major economic programs.
The program of Guayana consisted, then, of integrating
the existing projects into a complex development that would
not only generate positive effects at the regional level, but,
primarily, that was going to push forward the development of
the country. It would mean its economic diversification, the
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possibility of exporting industrial products, a decline in the
trend of population concentration in the central region (where
Caracas is), and the incorporation of a backward region to the
national process of development (2). All of this would be
reached through the diffusion effects of the concentration of
aluminium industries, steel mills, heavy machinery, electro-
chemical complexes, and plants for pulp and paper production,
all of it in the area of confluence of the Orinoco and the
Caroni rivers, near the sources of raw materials (3). Parado-
xically enough, the national and regional planning agencies
tried to solve the Venezuelan economic problem of an indus-
trial base characterized by "final assembly industry [that]
accentuated import demand without contributing to export
earning of foreign exchange", by directly promoting capital-
intensive activities that would increase problems of un- and
underemployment, would create technological subordination to
developed countries, and would be highly dependent on interna-
tional prices and markets (4). Following the concept of growth
poles, and relying on market forces and on private entrepre-
neurship (national as well as international), it was expected
that such a public investment and natural resources scenario
would attract the private investment needed to propel the
process of economic development.
Social infrastructure was necessary both to satisfy the
needs of the growing population, and to attract economic
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activities. Instead of following the traditional approach of
closed camps assumed in the oil areas, it was decided to plan
a new city.
A team of foreign planners (the Joint Center of MIT and
Harvard University) was hired to advise the Venezuelan go-
vernment. In the early 1960's, Venezuela did not have many
professionals in the field of planning, and some of the most
competent ones actually refused to participate in the program
(5). However, it might be thought that the decision to allo-
cate resources to a foreign team was also due to the belief in
the superiority and adequacy of foreign knowledge and pat-
terns, a sort of ideological dependence.
The new city would be located precisely in the lands
around the confluence between the Orinoco and the Caroni
rivers. Seventy percent of the "developable" lands were bal-
dios (vacant lands without a known owner) which were declared
under CVG's control (6).
The Caroni river divided the "site" for the city into
two sectors: The East side, with the town of San FMlix (40 to
50 thousand inhabitants by 1963), with a growing proportion of
squatter settlements, and the West side, with a very low
population density, closer to the main industrial sites (See
Appendix 1). The population of the new city would grow from
12
50,000 people in 1962, to 600,000 in 1980 according to 1963
estimates (7). From 60 to 75 percent of this population would
be residing in the West side of the city (Puerto Ordaz). The
city would, then, have two functions: In the first place, to
work as a site for adequate reproduction of the low and mid-
dle-income inhabitants' labor force--in the first economic
plans "human resources" were just another input to optimize--:
Iron mines, hydroelectric plants, and steel mills
become useful only when combined with skillful hands and
trained minds, constructive human attitudes, and appro-
priate social institutions... (8). (Emphasis added).
In the second place, it would work as an attraction
focus for top officials and investors. Given that one of the
guidelines set for the city was to reach a balanced social,
economic and infrastructural development (9), some sectors of
the planning team proposed a mixed, integrated distribution of
social groups in the city. However, the class-bias of some
professionals and top officials led them to think that such a
mixture would create social conflicts and deteriorate the
image of "modern city" thus lowering its power of attraction
of investment (10). Both positions, theoretically, influenced
the final plan for the city. However, in practice, the areas
for lower-income residents included in the plan for the "mo-
dern", West sector of the city (Puerto Ordaz) did hardly fit
the needs and financial possibilities of the lower-income
immigrants. Furthermore, squatter settling was to be
directed--and, as much as possible, channeled by means of
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"reception areas"--towards the East side of the city (San
FClix). The West side became, then, the materialization of
the ideology of economic growth and modernization that under-
lied the program of Guayana.
The early history of the program and the city reflects
a predominant ideology that, as we will show through the case-
studies, remains basically unchanged, and still guides plan-
ning and implementation decisions. As Dinkelspiel points out,
... Betancourt [the President at the time] saw the
Guayana as a way to a new Venezuela--a modern industria-
lized nation freed from colonial status, no longer the
tresure lode of foreign oil companies... (11).
In the base of this ideology, we find the assumption
that socioeconomic development, or "the goal", is to achieve a
high rate of economic growth, and to modernize the habits and
social uses of the population, to adjust them to the required
pace of growth. Somehow, this official ideology seemed to
penetrate down into the socioeconomic structure, so that the
whole of population got convinced about the desirability of
economic growth through these major projects (12).
The goal of regional integrated development was also
"an important piece of the ideology of the new government"
(13). It would be seen as a way of redistribution of the
resources generated by the oil boom across the country, a way
of economically and spatially diversifying the country, by
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"sowing the oil" ("Sembrando el petr5leo", saying of the
President at the moment, R6mulo Betancourt).
Finally, the reliance on market mechanisms and private
investment, and thus, the need for reflecting in the new city
an attractive image of progress and modernization, was seen by
the officials and professionals in charge of the program as
necessarily leading to a class- and sectoral-seggregated solu-
tion.
1.2. The new city: 1960-1980
The evolution of Ciudad Guayana has been extensively
documented. The general--and obvious-- conclussion is that
its economic and sociodemographic development has not followed
the expected trends. These results can be partly attributed
to the strategy of development itself; to some extent, they
can also be attributed to the failures and misinterpretations
of the reality during the initial planning process. Thirdly,
they are also due to the type of intervention carried on by
the State--undoubtedly related with the two former elements--,
represented by the CVG. In this section, we will (a) briefly
summarize the general characteristics and problems of the city
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today, and (b)explain how the development strategy and the
planning process are partly responsible for those problems,
and how they pose constraints to current actions of the CVG.
This will constitute a framework for the analysis of CVG and
its current interventions upon low income communities.
Current characteristics and problems of the city
In sum, the main characteristics of the city, with
respect to the plan developed in the early 1960's, are the
following (figures supporting these conclussions are presented
in Appendix 2):
1. The city has not grown at the speed considered in 1963
(initial) estimates. By April 1980, its total population
was 339,820 inhabitants, slightly above half of the estimate
for 1980 made in 1963.
2. The distribution of the population between the two sectors
of the city is the opposite as expected; San FMlix is now
the more--and more densely--populated of the two sectors,
while it was supposed to receive only from 25 to 30% of the
total population.
3. Since the economic linkages which were expected did not
take place, and since the attraction generated by the city
upon the neighboring, depressed areas was not intro-
duced into the calculations, the socioeconomic profile of
the current population looks completely different to what
was expected, with a majority of the population being
unable to get access to the housing opportunities provided
by the State or the private enterprises.
4. The rate of unemployment of San FMlix is higher than that
of Puerto Ordaz (8.6% and 3.3% respectively, by April
1980). Unemployment in the city as a whole has reached
critical levels during certain periods. In July 1968, for
example, 18.4% of the labor force was unemployed. This fact
is related to the extreme dependence upon unstable
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activities, such as construction.
5. Both San Fslix and Puerto Ordaz have a high percentage of
their population dedicated to service activities (50.0% of
the total employed population in San Fdlix, and 48.3% of
the employed population in Puerto Ordaz) . Informal activi-
ties are an important source of income for poor population,
specially in the case of San FMlix, where regulations about
use of the structures are more difficult to enforce, and
where most of the population not absorbed by the formal
economy is living.
6. A big percentage of San FMlix's housing units are "ranchos"
(33.7% of its housing units: 89.9% of the total number of
ranchos in the whole city). Puerto Ordaz, on the other
hand, has 10.1% of the total number of ranchos in the city,
which comprise 7.1% of the sector's total number of housing
units (14).
The failures of the development strategy
The program of Guayana was explicitly conceived as a
"growth pole", with its growth center located in Ciudad Guaya-
na. On the basis of mixed (public-private) investment on a
few "motorizing" projects that would generate "linkages", the
area was supposed to attract complementary activities, to
diffuse economic development to the neighboring regions, and
to impel overall national economic growth (15).
John Friedmann justified this strategy of imbalanced
growth for the region partly on the base of Venezuela's histo-
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rical experience, which he viewed as a result of "choice"--and
as a positive one:
... Venezuela has adopted an implicit 'core-region'
strategy. This means that over a sustained period Vene-
zuela is investing large sums in the expansion of a few
metropolitan regions that have great potentialities for
economic growth, and is guiding the spread effects of
these investments to areas that are functionally linked
with the core region... (16).
Such a concentration was rather an effect of the ex-
port-oriented, dependent-capitalist character of Venezuelan
economy, which tended to generate accelerated urbanization in
the North-central region, increasing social conflicts in the
cities, and a center-periphery relation between the "core-
regions" and the depressed areas. The same effects could be
expected as a result of an "explicit" strategy, given that the
general nature of the economy and the system of distribution
remained unchanged.
In practice, even though certain industries were
attracted to the area, Ciudad Guayana never could generate the
expected system of economic linkages, and it became an island,
or rather, an economic enclave within the region (17). The
city did attract thousands of unskilled immigrants from the
neighboring, depressed areas. The capital-intensive character
of the industries in Ciudad Guayana impeded the absorption of
this growing population by the urban "formal" economy, genera-
ting the high unemployment and underemployment rates we have
talked about. The spread effects over the space did not take
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place as expected.
Friedmann attributes these failures to institutional
problems and lack of national integration of the regional
strategies (18). Other authors argue that they are due to the
fact that the heavy industries--e.g., steel mills--do not tend
to create linkages, contrarily to the general belief in the
1950's: On the one hand, they pay high salaries that tend to
discourage other enterprises to establish their branches close
to these heavy industries; on the other hand, their scale
allows them to self-provide many of the services and comple-
mentary activities, that would not be demanded, then, from the
surroundings (19). However, it has been generally proved that
this kind of consequences are mostly due to the inapplicabili-
ty of growth pole theories under capitalist-dependent condi-
tions: In the first place, because the growth pole theory,
as originally conceived by Perroux, was actually divorced from
spatial considerations, and thus, its applications to a
spatial, regional setting might involve weak assumptions (20).
In the second place (and supposing the above is ignored),
because the conditions in developed countries, from which the
growth pole theory was derived, do not resemble the conditions
in an underdeveloped country like Venezuela: Non-hierarchi-
cal, primate-city-size distribution of the urban centers,
discouragement of vertical integration through the favorable
tariff treatment to intermediate inputs (a consequence of
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import-substituting, highly protected industrialization).
(21).
Thus, in brief, the type of development strategy as-
sumed attracted immigrants and activities ("informal" activi-
ties) whose socioeconomic profile diverged from the one consi-
dered by the economic strategy applied. This effect was a
"given" for the planners of the city, and for the implementing
institution; the issue was, then, how would the planners of
the city, and later on, the implementing institution respond
to the demands they faced.
The failures of the planning process
The planning process for the city was not adapted to
the changing needs of the real city. It rather tried to
follow, blindly, the guidelines imposed by the economic stra-
tegy, that is: (a) creating an attractive, modern city; (b)
planning for a population with a socioeconomic profile cohe-
rent with the modern industrial structure that derived from
the economic model.
The class-bias of some of the Venezuelan professionals
and top officials, and the "evolutionist-modernizing" notion
held by part of the Joint Center team, are considered two of
the causes for this divorce between planning and reality (22).
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Some members of the Joint center team have also pointed to the
organizational inadequacies of the process, primarily to the
fact that most of the team was based on Caracas, instead of on
Ciudad Guayana. Even though it was convenient for part of it
to be connected to the evolution in national guidelines taking
place in Caracas, this centralization of the team implied a
big gap between the image held by the planners and the actual
situation. Guided by different concerns, and from their diver-
se view-points, the consultants expressed:
... Isolated physically from the real city of the pre-
sent, and isolated organizationally and conceptually
from the political and economic interest groups in which
their enterprise had its being, [the designers of the
city] tended to leave these out of their calculations
and to develop their own lines of work... (23).
... (The interaction between urban development and econo-
mic programs] was more visible in Guayana than in Cara-
cas, where the economic development function was
obscured by the urgency to find solutions to the urban
problems of this rapidly expanding metropolis. Housing
and physical planning in Caracas were typically handled
in gross ignorance of underlying economic forces...
(24).
In sum, this divorce of the planners and designers from
reality, together with the idealism involved in the process,
generated a very unequal distribution of resources between the
two sectors of the city and among the different interest
groups of the city. The West side (Puerto Ordaz), the "mo-
dern" one, held certain social mixture, but its lowest income
housing, as we have already said, was not affordable by most
of the low-income immigrants. On the other hand, squatter
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settling was prohibited and physically rejected from this
side. Reception areas for the poorer immigrants--all of them
in the East side-- were insufficient, and this sector, as we
showed above, became the one with poorest supply of services,
highest level of un- and underemployment, and lowest standards
of housing (25).
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II.- THE CORPORACION VENEZOLANA DE GUAYANA (CVG)
This chapter briefly describes CVG's history, original
goals, internal structure, planning style (including the lea-
ding ideology), and main functional problems. All these ele-
ments, understood within the historical framework exposed in
the first chapter, will help to interpret CVG's motivations
and problems in dealing with low income communities in Ciudad
Guayana.
4.1. Definition, objectives, area of action
The "Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana" is a regional
development agency especially created to plan and implement
the projects considered by the Guayana program. Its legal
status is that of "...autonomous institute, with its own legal
personality, and with patrimony different and independent
from the National Treasury; it is directly attached to the
President's office" (26). It was created on December 29, 1960,
through the President's decree #430, which defines CVG's cha-
racter, scope, goals, and patrimony.
Its objectives were, in sum: (a) To study the
available resources in the Guayana region; (b) to study the
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hydroelectric potential of the CaronI river; (c) to plan for
the integrated development of the region, according to the
National Plan; (d) to promote the industrial development of
the region, both through public and private sector's actions;
(e) to coordinate social and economic functions of other
public institutions; (f) to contribute to the organization,
development and operation of the needed public services in the
region, and (g) to carry on other functions without its area
of action, when it is required (27).
The area of action of the CVG--the "Development Zone"--
was defined by the presidential decree # 28 (3/4/1960), being
much smaller than the natural region of Guayana, South of the
Orinoco river. The development zone comprised, roughly, the
lands that would be occupied by Ciudad Guayana and the Guri
dam on the Caroni river, that is, it just included the areas
dedicated to the main development projects of the Guayana
program. Later, as the interest for a wholly regional deve-
lopment of the nation grew, and as CVG began to change the
emphasis of its function (change which will be discussed
below), the area of action of CVG was gradually growing.
Currently, it embraces more than 50% of the national territory
(28).(See Appendix 3).
The CVG was created as a corporate rather than a co-
ordinating entity, after what Dinkelspiel (29) called "unsuc-
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cessful experiences" of the National Development Agency (1945-
1948), the Office for Special Studies (1953-1958), and the
Institute of Iron and Steel (1958-1960). A corporate kind of
solution was selected, according to Friedmann (30), because it
would mobilize resources more readily, achieve a decisive
coordinate action more easily, hold a more global view of all
the diverse elements involved in the Guayana program, and,
over all, "underscore the determination of the government to
assign top priority to the Guayana program" more easily than a
system of coordinated institutions.
4.2. Organizational structure
In terms of organizational structure, the CVG has also
undergone many transformations, supposedly related to its
changing functions, to the growth and changes in its area of
action, and also to the gradual moving of the offices to
Ciudad Guayana. Such transformations took place in the years
1963, 1970, 1971, 1979, and 1981. Authors like M.P. Garcia
(31), argue that the changes have been rather formal, and not
in the contents and objectives originally established.
Its hierarchical organization included in 1981 a Direc-
tory, a Presidency, eleven management offices (gerencias) and
three divisions (it has not been possible to find information
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about the differences between a "gerencia" and a "divisidn").
It is difficult to reach better conclussions about CVG's
overall organization only by looking at its organizational
charts (Appendix 4). However, it can be noticed that the
changes in 1970 included the following facts: The major
economic enterprises were not a functional part of CVG any-
more, and the Division of Human Resources (today's Division
of Social and Cultural Development, important for our case
studies ) appeared in that year.
4.3. Implications of CVG's administrative and planning
style
In the first place, the administrative and planning
style of the CVG reflects the character of the program for
whose management it was created. As we have said, the CVG was
especially created to run a program with primarily national
objectives, assumed to be responding to a notion of "public
interest" that was represented by the goal of increasing the
national rate of economic growth. According to certain
authors, an image of political neutrality and nonpartisanship
would provide the Corporation with the general popular support
needed to carry on its tasks; in fact, this was the type of
image and administrative style--a technocratic one--that CVG
assumed.
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Among the concrete expressions of such an administra-
tive and planning style we find the following: (a) utiliza-
tion of noncontroversial figures in the institution--that is,
officials not explicitly involved with any party--; (b) iden-
tification of the CVG and its projects with the "most deeply
felt nationalist sentiments of Venezuela"; (c) rejecting
projects that only had regional or local significance, since
it was thought that identification with such interests would
have broken its nonpartisan image; (d) avoiding being identi-
fied with particular ministries and its projects, since they
were generally related to political parties, and (e) hiring
foreing consultants to give "confiability" to the result.
Dinkelspiel conclusions on CVG's administrative style reflect
the prevailing ideology within the decision-making bodies:
[The technocratic administrative style] permits the
Corporation to reap the benefits that the great popular
appeal of modern technology can bestow in a developing
country... (32).
... If a public agency can show that its decisions
simply reflect the technologically best choice, it
stands a good chance of sustaining public belief in its
nonpartisanship... (33).
The technocratic style christallized in a geographic
location of the CVG that has in turn shaped its interventions
and reinforced the technocratic style: By 1963, most of its
offices were in Caracas, the capital of the country, 700
Kilometers away from Ciudad Guayana. A few operational units
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were on the site, and the unit of Urban Planning had an office
in Ciudad Bolivar, the main city in the Guayana region, ap-
proximately 100 kms far from Ciudad Guayana, but most of the
planning was done and most of the decisions were taken in
Caracas.
Some of the effects of such a distribution of the
personnel have been briefly commented on in the former chap-
ter, when talking about the failures of the initial planning
process, in which, as we know, CVG was a main actor. It is
interesting to extend this point further, since it is related
to some of the problems occurring nowadays. Many authors
have pointed out that the separation and divergence of
approaches between the offices of CVG in Caracas and the
people in "the site" have hindered the flow of feedback to
improve the planning product in Caracas, and thus, have hin-
dered the product of the planning process from being an
adequated support for actions in the site (34). This divergen-
ce was felt much more strongly in the site, where it was seen
as a "painful inaccessibility to power", while it was seen in
Caracas as "exasperating tendencies of particular local inte-
rests" (35).
Currently, the CVG has been losing financial control
over the subsidiary enterprises--that is, the major national
economic projects--which were the concrete expressions of
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CVG's national importance, and "justified" its technocratic
style. So, the urban and regional development tasks, seen
until the 1970's as the "political" side of its role (and
which, even though unwillingly, it had to face), have been
reinforced (36). Besides that, and probably because of the in-
creasing social pressures generated as Ciudad Guayana was
growing, by 1982 most of CVG offices were moved to Ciudad
Guayana (37). However, these changes have not necessarily
generated a more participatory pattern in CVG's approach and
interventions: There is a clear class gap between the plan-
ners and the people living in the city, and there is a comple-
tely different perception of the reality at different levels
within the CVG. Now, the dichotomy Caracas-site has been
reproduced in a dichotomy top planners-field workers.
It could be said, from the analysis of the available
literature, that the popular and local interests have always
been subordinated to what was conceived by a planning elite as
the national interests. It was done, however, in a rather
implicit way. Now, the shift of emphasis to urban and
regional development tasks has taken place parallel to an
explicit national policy of creation of formal linkages be-
tween the State and the grass-roots, a policy derived from the
Christian-democrat doctrine, and which we would say to be
making the above mentioned subordination explicit. One of the
hypotheses pointed out, though not deeply worked, through the
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following case-studies, is that CVG, in its interventions upon
low income communities, is directly reflecting the Christian-
democrat notion of "popular promotion" which has become one of
the guidelines of the Sixth National Develoment Plan (1981-
1985), released by the current Christian-democrat administra-
tion. This would mean that the formal nonpartisanship alleged
by Dinkelspiel is not being held by the CVG anymore. With
respect to CVG's actual relationships to political parties in
Venezuela, some authors have commented that they were given
only on a personal basis (38); others view that certain sec-
tors were relatd with,and actually acting according to, that
relationship to particular parties, due to particular politi-
cal conjunctures (39), and some others definitely find a
correlation between CVG approaches and the ideology of the
party in power at the time (40).
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III.- THE PROCESS OF RELOCATION OF "COLINAS DE UNARE"
The following pages present the story and preliminary
analysis of a particular intervention of the CVG with respect
to the "urban poor" in Ciudad Guayana. The study is on a case
of demolition of a squatter settlement located in the area
known as Colinas de Unare, in Puerto Ordaz, ordered and imple-
mented by the CVG. Demolition was followed, in this particular
case, by the relocation of the affected population.
The account begins in April 1981. There was a well-
established population in the area of study, and CVG seemed to
have already decided to demolish the "barracks"--as the CVG
documents call Colinas de Unare's housing units. This initial
decision might, by itself, tell a lot about the kinds of
assumptions and values guiding the actions of CVG. In ad-
dition, it will be shown how such a decision was implemented,
by integrating and controlling a process of community mobili-
zation that began to take place under the threat of the dislo-
cation.
All the information comes either from reports written
by CVG members involved in the process, or from personal
interviews to CVG officials, made in February 1983. Since no
information could directly be collected from the community,
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many important points in the interpretation of facts had to be
left as hypotheses, until such a direct contact could be made.
3.1. The History of CVG interventions towards squatter
settlements
Colinas de Unare is just one case, among many, of land
"invasion" and squatter settlement in Ciudad Guayana. For
reasons that we have already explained, the city's growth has
mainly involved the immigration of thousands of inhabitants
from depressed, surrounding areas. The controls established by
CVG and other governmental institutions have physically shaped
that unexpected demographic growth, creating an imbalance
between the two main sectors of the city (San Felix and Puerto
Ordaz), and reinforcing even more the contradictions created
by the aplication of the concept of "growth pole" within the
economic conditions of a country like Venezuela.
The sector of San FMlix, including the old town, and
not being subjected to as much control as Puerto Ordaz, re-
ceived most of the immigrants since 1960. These immigrants
came from declining oil areas or from the depressed surroun-
dings. The growth of the sector of San Felix took the form of
land "invasions", squatting, sometimes channelled by the
institutions through the creation of "reception areas", and
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some other times (most of them) without any provision. By
1979, as we have said, 33.7% of San FMlix housing was "ran-
chos". That percentage does not include those old squatter
settlements that have undergone a significant physical
improvement. All of these cases added together give an idea
of the magnitude of the squatting process in San FMlix since
the sixties.
The section of Puerto Ordaz, on the other hand, has
been strongly controlled by the planning and administrative
apparatus. It is the "planned" city, it is the "image" of
industrial development and progress that Betancourt's go-
vernment wanted to build. Much fewer squatter settlements
took place in this section, due to the open repression against
them; when they appeared, they mostly did it in areas where
they were protected by difficult visibility. Examples like
Castillito (close to the bank of the Caroni river), Los Oli-
vos, and Colinas de Unare (whose growth was dissimulated by
dense vegetation around), show it. There have also been inva-
sions in vacant apartment buildings constructed by the Natio-
nal Housing Institute (INAVI), given the delays in their
allocation, or the existence of irregular (or regular) ele-
ments impeding the access of worse-off sectors to the
apartments in those buildings.
The main characteristics of land "invasions" in Ciudad
33
Guayana have been (41):
a) They are collective: Groups of families, rather than
individual families, carry on the invasion process; this
guarantees having a stronger bargaining position or a
stronger physical resistance in case of facing negotiations
with the institutions or actual repression.
b) They are very well organized: The squatting groups plan in
advance the process of land invasion and redistribution, in
most cases with a strong egalitarian sense. In many cases,
there exist maps that guide the invasion, and politicized
sectors lead the process. The squatting groups, as we will
note below, take advantage of particular political-
economic conjunctures that ease or guarantee the success
of the invasion. These points help contradict the lo-
cally widespread idea that squatter settlements are neces-
sarily disorganized social settings.
c) They are not a constant process, but present "peaks", when
certain economic and political conditions are given. The
historical moments when invasions have become more frequent
and massive are:
-- At the beginning of the development of the city
(1960's), when the big attraction for construction
labor took place.
-- In the period 1974-1978, under the presidency of the
Social-democratic leader Carlos Andres Perez, when
heavy investment was allocated for the construction of
34
the "Plan IV" of the Orinoco Siderurgical Plant.
-- In electoral years, because the political party in the
government, trying to guarantee its persistence in
power, avoids any kind of severe conflict with
any sector of the population. Land invasions and the
political struggle that accompanies them are typical
instruments for political manipulation. According to
information given by CVG officials, a relative increase
in the number of invasions in Ciudad Guayana
can be noticed now. Elections will be held in seven
more months, in December 1983.
The types of responses of the CVG to these movements
have been diverse. Besides the establishment of insufficient
"reception areas", attempts to dislodge have been the most
common type of intervention. They have been much stronger in
the area of Puerto Ordaz. Barrios like Castillito, the oldest
in Puerto Ordaz, have been pressured to dislodge without
success; the barrio La Unidad ("the Unity") was dislodged and
re-took its lands later; relatively recently, a group of
families occupying an area destined to industrial uses in San
FMlix was dislodged without being given any alternative for
living. In other cases, a process of relocation has followed.
Most of the families in these conditions have been sent to the
area of Vista Al Sol (UD-134, UD-135, and UD-136) a peripheral
section of San FMlix, where they were to be housed either by
un-aided self-help construction or by finished housing pro-
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vided by the National Housing Institute (INAVI), receiving
the land lots through a special rent arrangement with FUNVICA
(Foundation for Housing "Caroni") which seems to have been not
so succesful. In terms of barrio consolidation as a compre-
hensive intervention (that is, systematic, nonincremental
improvements in services networks, communal areas, housing, on
the basis of the existing settlement), only one case, besides
the one proposed for lower Colinas de Unare, has taken place,
and it has also been very recently (1982): The case of the
barrio Guaicaipuro, a small settlement in San FMlix.
In summary, Colinas de Unare is a very unique experience
in terms of the kind of consolidation and relocation proces-
ses to which it has been subjected, while it is one among the
many barrios of Ciudad Guayana generated through land inva-
sion. The accounts gathered by means of CVG officials' re-
ports and interviews, will help to have an insight (maybe not
a comprehensive one!) into the reasons for that, as well as to
build a perspective on how CVG is facing conflict with the
"poor" population in Ciudad Guayana.
3.2. The squatting process and the first demolitions
The area of Colinas de Unare (or Cerro Roberto) is
located South of Ciudad Guayana Airport, in the South-Eastern
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area of Puerto Ordaz, the "planned", West-bank section of
Ciudad Guayana. According to the city's plan, it occupies the
Development Units #245, #246 and #267 (UD-247, UD-246, UD-
267). It is characterized by its relatively higher situation
with respect to the lands surrounding it; for that reason,
the main water tanks for supplying Puerto Ordaz, and the
electric sub-station serving the acueduct were located on top
of the Colinas. According to CVG, the fact that Colinas de
Unare was assigned such an important service nucleus required
that the surrounding area was not given any residential use by
the plan of Ciudad Guayana. The area of Colinas de Unare,
then, also characterized by the presence of a small natural
forest on it, was supposed to stay as a piece of vacant land
within the planned section of Ciudad Guayana (42).
However, we have seen how the planning process of
Ciudad Guayana, in its underlying character of resources allo-
cator and distributor, ignored and left aside the biggest
"client" group of the city, which, paradoxically, the city
itself generated: The urban poor.
Since the beginning of the 1970's, Colinas de Unare
became a sort of "natural" reception area for immigrants from
rural towns or smaller cities, from Venezuela or other coun-
tries (Colombia, Ecuador...). These families, searching for
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work opportunities that in many cases the city could not offer
through "formal" mechanisms, and being absolutely unable to
qualify for obtaining housing from the "formal" supply, began
to constitute a growing squatter area in Colinas de Unare.
As we have said, Colinas de Unare was a vacant space protec-
ted, at least at the beginning, by vegetation that hid the
houses, relatively near to work places, schools and to the
center of Puerto Ordaz, and even though it was not urbanized,
the access to two main service sources was fairly easy from
the area: As well as the immigrants served their own selves in
terms of housing, they improvised connections to the water
pipes and electricity lines related to the water tanks on top
of the Colinas.
The assumption of their "right to the city" by those
unexpected inhabitants brought an imbalance to the planned
system. According to CVG officials,
This situation began to create problems to the flux
of water through the Puerto Ordaz acueduct, due to the
big number of perforations made in the tubing; the
forest area that protects the soil and contributes to
the improvement of the environment, also started suf-
fering a significant deterioration. On the other hand,
the proximity of the inhabited barracks to the hight
tension electricity lines, the lack of adequate ser-
vices -due to the fact that the sector was not destined
to residential use-, and the way they provided themsel-
ves with water and electricity, constitute a big risk to
the 'invaders'... (43).
It seems that these functional problems were not the
only ones that the officials from CVG viewed in this case.
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The ideology of "progress" and "modernization" imbedded in the
Guayana Project arises in other arguments:
... The families that have been occupying the area of
Colinas de Unare (...) mainly come from rural areas of
Venezuela and other countries. They present behavior
patterns which are characteristic of marginal sectors,
with low educational levels, inadequate habits with
respect to the use of public services, and to the social
urban coexistence (...) It is common to find 'conu-
cos'(subsistence cultivations) and animal raising (...)
This socio-cultural problematic, which does not fit into
the physonomy of a city with an industrial profile,
requires the application of certain measures leading to
the achievement of social integration... (44) (Emphasis
added).
The immigrants' adaptation to the economic conditions
imposed by the kind of seggregating development of Ciudad
Guayana was seen by CVG as having negative effects both on the
functioning and on the image of the city. From some indirect
references, it seems that CVG began to order the demolition of
certain barracks in Colinas de Unare; the rumor of a process
of elimination of the barrio grew among the population.
3.3. The reaction of the community
According to the declarations of some officials of CVG,
it seems that people in the area were believed to have a
negative attitude against the institution, due to "its indif-
ference with respect to the solution of the problems of basic
services" of Colinas de Unare (45). Once the threat of dislo-
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cation and elimination of the barracks began to concretize,
the community started organizing itself in a "solidarity move-
ment against the dislocation", gaining the support of other
communities and political organizations (46). At that moment,
the community did not organize itself around the formal
"neighborhood associations" considered by the law, but its
leaders seem to have been the persons that later on were
recognized as directors of the formal neighborhood associa-
tions (47). Though this shift in the attitude of the leaders
seems less likely to have happened than a shift in the actual
leaders, the available information supports the former hypo-
thesis.
Again, the capacity of organization of the people
around the defense of their community could be assumed as a
counter-argument to the above mentioned image of disintegra-
tion and marginality that the officials of CVG had about the
community of Colinas de Unare. Even though other cases of
resistence to dislocation had been faced by the institution,
this particular case seems to have looked particularly
threatening to it, probably because of the amount of popula-
tion involved, because of the political potential of the
movement, or because of the critical location of the community
within the city.
... [The invaders], facing the threat of being dislodged,
and being aware of usual procedures in theses cases,
decided to create their own organizations (...) These
40
circumstances created an explosive social situation of
impredictible consequences; it required the application
of a strategy that could approach the problem in a
delicate and precise way, in order to achieve a satis-
tory soTution for aTlthe involved parties, without
creating conflicts or violence, which generally bring
about unnecessary and regretable actions... (48) (Empha-
sis added).
CVG decided, then, as Pinelly states, to change its
strategy and go into the community, to negotiate a solution.
Direct contact was established with the neighborhood associa-
tions. Two neighborhood associations arose in Colinas de
Unare: One was representing the oldest, lowest part of the
barrio; the other, represented the higher, most recently in-
vaded lands. The party-affiliation of the leaders and other
members of the associations implied a particular political
influence in the two different organizations. The neighborhood
organization in the oldest area of Colinas de Unare was ba-
sically influenced by the Christian Democratic party (COPEI,
the party in power), and the more recent, less stabilized
section of Colinas de Unare received the influence of leftist
groups, and was particularly mobilized around the defense and
unity of the community.
The first outcome of the discussions with CVG was a
differential treatment to each of the two sections of the
barrio. The relatively flat, lower area was to be consolidated
in its same location; the higher area was to be relocated.
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Evidently, the second type of treatment implied higher econo-
mic and social costs for the affected community. Further-
more, the affected community was supposed to be the weakest in
the whole area, since it was still in the process of stabili-
zation in Colinas de Unare. In addition to that, this was the
population related to the leftist groups. It seems impossible
to determine the relative causal weights of those factors,
though evidently there is correlation.
In any case, no information about conflicts generated
by this first decision has been found. The institution esta-
blished as a first priority the relocation of the higher area
population; the consolidation of the lower area would take
place only if there were resources available after taking care
of the higher area. This agreement might explain the peaceful
acceptance of the differential interventions. Though, if we
see it in detail, it just meant that the "COPEI"-group, the
lower-Colinas group, was not touched by the intervention, and
if it was going to be, it would have been for a sort of
intervention that, instead of involving high costs as in the
former case, would bring about relatively "cheap" benefits.
CVG began, then, to analyze the conditions for the implementa-
tion of the relocation process, the subject on which we will
focus. The first objective was to develop a diagnosis of the
situation, with the input of the formal community organiza-
tions. From this point on, the accounts given by the available
CVG documents, instead of talking about the original "solida-
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rity movement against dislocation", start talking about the
neighborhood associations. The attitude of the latter,
furthermore, appears to be much more possitive towards colla-
boration with the institution's plans than the above mentioned
movement. We could establish a hypothesis: The CVG, in trying
to dissolve the threat of conflict generated by a spontaneous,
self-generated community organization, began to support alter-
native, less radical organizations that could ease the process
for the institution, both because of being (such an organi-
zation) willing and able to get down the possible unrest
(since they were part of the community, anyway), and because
of having the organizational structure considered in the law
for articulation of neighborhood demands.
In any case, CVG established a commission to take care
of the process of relocation. Once being set up, it made con-
tacts with the neighborhood organization and decided to carry
on a socio-economic survey of the affected population, whose
objective would be to provide the information needed about the
community in order to proceed with the relocation.
3.4. The socio-economic survey and the definition of
concrete goals
The survey was implemented by the members of the
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neighborhood association themselves, under the responsibility
of two directors of the neighborhood association of the higher
portion of the sector of Colinas de Unare to be relocated,
and one director of the association of the lower portion of
the sector to be relocated, and under the advice of a member
of the Division of Social and Cultural Development of the CVG,
which had just established an "office" near the area. Fifteen
people, all of them members of the neighborhood association,
made the interviews. To organize the process, the area was
divided in three sectors: Los Tanques (UD-245), and La Conge-
ladora (UD-246), from the higher part of the Colinas, and Los
Canales (UD-267), from the lower part. The survey was carried
on in the month of June of 1981. It contained questions about:
(1) For each member of the family: Name, kinship relation to
the head of family, sex, I.D.number, conjugal status, age,
educational level, place of birth, nationality, last place of
residence (before Colinas), time of being in the city, the
region and the country, occupation, place where worked, in-
come. (2) For each housing unit: type, building materials,
internal distribution, type of system of water supply, sewe-
rage, electricity, tenure of the housing unit, area of cons-
truction, area of lot, estimated cost of the unit.
The questionaire was designed and produced by the Divi-
sion of Social and Cultural Development of the CVG. In terms
of its results, nothing was possible to find through the
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interviews and reports, except for the number of occupied and
vacant housing units, the distribution of the total population
according to the nationality of the head of the household, and
the estimated cost of the housing unit. The latter was parti-
cularly important, given the fact that Venezuelan Law obligues
the government to pay for any improvement (bienhechurla) made
to a lot by any settler on it who has to be relocated. Those
were the only data published in the two main reports by the
coordinator of the project (49).
The results showed that there were 877 inhabited
houses, and 60 vacant houses (total: 937 units). From the 877
families, 76.4% had Venezuelan head of household (50). The
mean value of the cost of the units estimated by the residents
was Bs. 15,975 (51). This estimated cost, declared by the
inhabitants of the units, was compared later to an actually
professional calculation of the cost. This valuation was made
in the month of August, 1981, over a sample of 568 of the 877
inhabited houses. It resulted on a mean cost of Bs. 7,777.50
(52). The difference of approximately 100% between the mean
cost estimated by the families and the mean cost resulting
from the professional valuation is not explained by pure
chance. Devices to prove any hypothesis on why does that
difference exist are not available at the moment, but the
hypotheses could at least be formulated: (a) The difference
is partly due to a bias in the selection of the samples; (b)
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the difference is due to differing ways to evaluate the units
(e.g., the residents imputed extra cost for transportation,
paid labor-aid--which is not unusually received--, or other
concepts, or the evaluators used wholesaler costs in their
evaluations, while the materials were got by the residents in
a way that could have made it more expensive to them--data on
the costs of building and buying materials within and without
the "formal" housing market would be necessary to have, to
make better hypotheses); (c) the residents declared a higher
cost, so if an expropriation occured, the payment for their
housing units in Colinas would allow them to cope with the
increasing costs of building or renting a "rancho", or getting
housing from the formal supply.
The costs assumed for the continuation of the process
were those resulting from the professional valuation. That
would be the amount of money to be given to the residents in
exchange for their housing units, either in the form of cash
or of materials to build a new house in the relocation area.
By mid-1981, CVG had already decided on one possible
destination of the dislodged population. The insufficiency of
available land for the relocation (though the Puerto Ordaz
section of the city appears to be quite empty) made of it a
very fragmented process, as CVG officials recognize (53). The
CVG ordered the preparation of the UD-293 for residential-use.
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The UD-293 is a piece of flat land, four times smaller than
the UD-246, UD-247 and UD-267 together (area of origin of the
dislodged population); it is located about 2 kilometers West--
that is, farther from the "center" of the city--of Colinas de
Unare. Among the reasons that were given in the interviews
for the selection of this Development Unit, are: (a) it was an
area that was not already commited to any other use; (b) had
long been considered, by the Planning and Budget Office of
the CVG (OPPU) as a possible area for the reception of immi-
grants or "poor" population; (c) it is not easily seen from
the main road in Puerto Ordaz (the "Avenida Guayana"); and (d)
was surrounded by INAVI projects for low income residents, as
opposed to Colinas de Unare, that was neighboring the area of
"Jardin Levante", a residential area for medium class, mainly
occupied by CVG personnel.
The socioeconomic survey helped to establish the magni-
tude of the requirements for the relocation: 877 families
needed a new housing unit. The UD-293 had a maximal capacity
of 560 parcels, from which 45 had already been given through
the National Housing Institute, INAVI, to families from dif-
ferent areas. So, in the UD-293 only 515 of the dislodged
families could be relocated. 362 families were still to be
given a place to live. Of those, 51 families decided that
they did not want to be relocated by CVG in the UD-293, and
that they would rather receive the cost of their expropriated
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materials in cash (54). CVG asked for the collaboration of
other neighborhood associations of the city, in order to find
vacant lots to relocate other families. A total of 200 lots
in "irregular" situation (unknown owners, lack of ownership
document...) were identified in the area of San FMlix; from
them, it was known that at least 98 would be ready for occupa-
tion by January 1983. That would reduce the deficit to 213
families to be relocated (the figures diverge form one docu-
ment to another), but that would be in case 98 families would
agree on moving to San FMlix. In fact, by December 1982, only
20 families had agreed on that. Residents of Colinas de Unare
worked, studied, and had already built a social network in
Puerto Ordaz, not being willing to move from all those fami-
liar advantages (55).
On July 1981, after having the results of the survey,
CVG had, at least, two main tasks to achieve: To find ways to
solve the deficit of land for the relocation, and to, some-
how, convince 515 families to accept the actual opportunity of
relocation in the UD-293, without using any violent method.
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3.4. The first training course and the assignment of
lots in the UD-293
A good way to convince the population about the possi-
ble advantages of relocation was to set an example of what an
alternative to the housing solutions in Colinas de Unare could
look like. CVG decided to select 15 unemployed young people
of the barrio (the selection criteria are not explained), who
would be trained in construction techniques through the actual
construction of 12 housing units in the UD-293. The families
of those 15 people would have the priority for being assigned
the finished units. The process of training and construction
would last 60 days, and would include the participation of the
families of the trained youngsters, under the motivation for
"living in a better home than the one they had at the Colinas"
(56). Some skilled residents of the Colinas participated as
instructors for the course, under the advice of a member of
the INCE (National Institute for Worker's Training and Educa-
tion) (57).
The training process took the expected time, but the
weather and some financial and administrative problems delayed
the finishing of the housing units. Another 12 youngsters were
introduced to the training process, trying to accelerate the
construction of the first twelve units and to build an addi-
tional group of five housing units. There were also budgetary
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and administrative problems in achieving this second goal; so,
at the end of the period for the second course (December 31,
1981), the situation was as follows (58):
- Registered participants: 26
- Retired participants: 01
- Finishing participants: 25
- Hours of training: 776
- Finished houses: 08
- Partially finished houses: 08
- Inhabited houses: 16
- Eliminated barracks: 16
As it can be seen, the families moved to the houses
even before they were completely ready. One of the twelve
first units, which is missing in the account above, was assig-
ned to a member of the community who wanted to experiment with
pre-fabricated systems (59).
Through this kind of strategy, the CVG was actually
exploiting the value of individual entrepreneurship in a-
chieving the goal of "having a better housing unit" ("better",
according to the institution's criteria). We will see that,
while the community organizations seemed to have supported the
idea of collective solutions, according to CVG documents the
institution seems to have looked for the community action
through undermining its collective process--which might have
implied a more politicized position against CVG-- by promoting
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individual initiative. Re-taking the first statement of this
section, CVG was not only "setting an example", as the insti-
tution would argue: It was also penetrating, in a subtle
manner, the community organization.
The trainning course project seems to have had the
expected effects on the community, if the neighborhood asso-
ciation is to be assumed as a good representative of it (60).
On December 23, 1981, the Directors of the neighborhood asso-
ciation presented to the CVG officials the statement of the
residents' interest in being assigned vacant lots in the UD-
293, in order to build their own houses. The residents expres-
sed their willingness to design and construct their own type
of units, since they did not like very much the models made by
the institution (61). The lots were to be bought by the
families under certain conditions. In principle, the cost of
the barracks in Colinas de Unare would be somehow paid to the
relocated residents. As we can guess from the broad differen-
ce between the institution's and the residents' valuations of
the housing units, there were conflicts in the process of
definition of the amount to be paid. The available documents
say that very few residents agreed with the institution, but
at the end their acceptance was obtained by CVG (62). No
details are given on the bargaining process or the reasons
for the community to accept, but it could be hypothesized that
the lack of bargaining power of the community, due to the lack
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of stronger, cohesive, politically clear organizations, to-
gether with the manipulation through the formal community
organizations, or the community's fear of losing any possible
return when expeled from their original barracks, lead the
residents to accept the deal. The cost of the land was set
between 60 and 100 Bolivares per square meter (1 1982-bolIvar=
4.3 dollars; 1 1983-bolivar = 8 to 10 dollars) (63).
CVG documents state that the lots were assigned to
those people "who were interested in receiving them". Should
that be interpreted as "who could articulate their demands in
order to reach the institution", or "who could establish a
convenient relation with the neighborhood associations"...?
We have seen that only 51 families rejected being relocated by
CVG, so there were 826 families that supposedly would need to
be relocated. Being aware that they would be dislodged any-
way, which family would not be interested in receiving a lot?
Possibly, those sectors of the community that still did not
accept the dislocation or those that noticed that they would
not be able to afford the costs involved in the relocation.
Not much on this aspect can be extracted from the documents.
CVG established certain requirements of elegibility to provide
the lots to the families that manifested their interest;
through them, the CVG attempted to avoid certain irregulari-
ties in the process of of lot allocation. The requirements
were:
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a) having been surveyed by the association and the
CVG in June 1981; b) having neighborhood relations to
other beneficiaries; c) being a permanent resident,
together with his/her family, in Colinas de Unare...
(64).
The costs involved in the process of relocation
constituted, by themselves, another constraint to overcome,
and in fact, they restricted the ability of the worse-off
families.
Each beneficiary was given a written certificate of the
receipt of the lot, and was required to present a draft of
the design of the house to be built, in order to be revised in
terms of the standards and rules to follow. A formal contract
was signed by the CVG and the National Institute for Worker's
Trainning and Education, INCE, in February 1982, in order to
provide train ing in construction to the residents that were
interested in it. The contents and implications of the con-
tract will be presented later on.
3.6. Different alternatives provided to the families to
be relocated in the UD-293
The neighborhood associations, as we have said, were
interested in a solution as "uniform" (unless it were against
equity) as possible for all the members of the community. In
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the beginning of the bargaining process, the alternative pro-
posed to the people to be relocated was to give them the
worth of their housing unit in Colinas in the form of cons-
truction materials for their new houses in the UD-293. Some
residents, thinking that this alternative would have adminis-
trative difficulties that would delay the process, preferred
to receive the worth of their barracks in cash, or, in other
words, to subtract that amount of money from the cost of the
lot assigned to them in the UD-293. This second alternative,
according to the available documents, seemed to be attractive
only to the better-off families in the community. The
neighborhood association rejected this initiative, since it
would mean a differential timing in the solution for the
different members of the community. However, the fact that
other alternatives already began to function (e.g., the re-
location of the families that participated in the first
construction training course by CVG...), persuaded the asso-
ciations to allow for the other alternatives to be implemen-
ted.
The resulting alternatives are summarized by Vasquez
(65), as follows:
Alternative 1: The cost of the barrack is subtracted from the
cost to be paid for the lot in the UD-293, and the
beneficiary builds by his/her own means: 164 families.
Alternative 2: The cost of the barrack is paid in the form of
construction materials; the beneficiary builds by him/herself
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and adds the rest of the materials needed: 103 families.
Alternative 3: INAVI offers a "popular credit" through the
delivery of ~a State-built housing unit or construction
materials: 118 families.
Alternative 4: The members of the family participate in
courses implemented by the INCE, being then given the result-
ing housing units to those participants: 88 families.
Alternative 5: The cost of the barrack is paid to the resid-
ent in cash: 40 families.
In any of the cases, eventhough the family is supposed
to receive or have the possibility to build a better housing
unit than they had before, the family has to afford a cost
that they did not have to think of while living in the Colinas.
Besides that, the solution given by CVG did not seem to take
care of the petty-commerce existing in Colinas de Unare; if it
was included within the structure of the housing unit, at
least it would be included in the valuation; if not, it is
not clear whether the locals for the "bodegas" would be also
paid to the owners (under the condition that they were resi-
dents, of course). Another unclear point is the one about
finance. It is expectable that CVG would provide convenient
conditions to the relocated families to pay the land lot they
were being provided with as property. Nothing on that respect
is said in the available documents. Anyway, since it is so
difficult for a family with scarce resources or unstable
sources of income to be granted a loan--unless a parti-
cular State program is specially created for that end--the
additional costs to rebuild the house and move would be a
significant economic problem for the families.
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3.7. The elimination of barracks
By March 1982, seventy "barracks" had been dismantled,
only twenty of them because their residents were relocated to
the UD-293, through the regular procedures considered in the
program. The rest were dismantled for reasons different from
the "regular" relocation process: Thirty six units were moved
to the UD-293 during an emergency situation caused by heavy
rain in July, 1981. Two were eliminated because their owners
already lived in another unit in Colinas de Unare. Six units
were eliminated because it was proved that their owners lived
somewhere else in the city. One additional unit was also
eliminated because it was built after the survey made by CVG
and the neighborhood association; two more were in the same
situation, but it is clearly stated in the documents that they
were built by "non-Venezuelans". Another three units were
eliminated when CVG discovered that they belonged to "non-
Venezuelans that had left for their country". From these
twenty four barracks in "irregular" situation, one could think
that at least eight, one third of them, were dedicated to
renting. Though there is not data on this issue, it is known
that rental market plays an important role within the so-
called "marginal" communities. CVG did not provide any kind
of solutions to those families, according to the documents re-
vised (66).
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In the second place, the importance given by CVG to the
nationality of the members of the family must be highlighted,
even though it seems that no differential treatments are
applied to the "non-Venezuelans".
In the third place, it is interesting that, besides the
few restrictions to the elegibility for relocation at the UD-
293, (see quote on page 53, section 3.5) this is the only
stage of the process where the criteria for selection of the
"affected" or "benefited" families is clearly expressed. The
lack of written criteria for the selection of subjects of
policy throughout the accounts and documents revised consti-
tutes a very critical point. It might mean both the possibi-
lity of arbitrary decisions, affected by particular
circumstances and interests, the possible lack of conscious-
ness and objectives of CVG, in relation to non-creation of
inequality or unfair results through the process, and the lack
of a concrete ground for the discussion with the community.
(Of course, on the other hand, having written criteria does
not guarantee at all that the process will not be arbitrary,
or that the community will have the chance to discuss such
criteria).
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3.8. The Institutional Frame
The participation of the CVG:
The Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana, given its res-
ponsibility over the process of urban development of Ciudad
Guayana, assumed the task of coordinating the relocation of
the community of upper-Colinas de Unare. Many of its "divi-
sions" (in other sources, called "management offices") were
involved in the process in one way or another, which meant a
certain level of complexity in the decision making and imple-
mentation procedures. As we mentioned at some points during
the account, administrative and financial problems, generally
caused by delays in the process, affected the implementation
of certain steps, while creating confusion and distrust among
the affected population. According to the documents recently
published by members of CVG involved in the process, problems
of institutional coordination have appeared also in the last
months (67).
The divisions involved in the program were:
1.- Division of Engineering and Construction (DIC): Provided
the economic resources for physically developing the UD-
293, for paying for the houses to be demolished, and for
the implementation of the demolition itself.
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2.- Division of Finance and Control (DFC): Provided the sup-
port and control in administrative issues.
3.- Division of Urban Planning (DPU): Together with DIC, plan-
ned the "physical" aspects in the UD-293 (i.e., lot
distribution, services and infrastructure).
4.- Division of Real Estate: Has under its responsibility
the administration of the land and infrastructure owned by
the CVG in Ciudad Guayana; thus, it was in charge of
selling the land lots at the UD-293 to the relocated
families.
5.- Division of Cultural and Social Development (DDSC): It
assumed the responsibility over all the "social aspects"
of the project, such as land lots' allocation, self-help
construction processes, community organization and
training of the population. According to the documents
revised, an inter-divisions committee was created in March
3, 1982, including representatives for all of the above
mentioned divisions, and being coordinated by the "chief"
of the project "South Airport", within whose limits Coli-
nas de Unare and the UD-293 were (68).
Since in all the available documents the DDSC is pre-
sented as having a leading role in the program, the rest of
the divisions acting as "providers" of the support needed for
the implementation, it would be interesting to add some data
on the DDSC goals and functions.
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The DDSC, former Division of Human Development, has as
its primary goal
the promotion of social and cultural development of
the inhabitants and communities of the region, through
the provision of a general and broader access to the
benefits of education, culture and information, in order
to strengthen human solidarity, to improve social, cul-
tural and political conditions of marginality, and to
establish the base for a fairer social order. In achie-
ving those goals, the DDSC has incentivated the people
to actively participate in the decision-making processes
related to community issues, according to the guidelines
established in the VI National Plan... (69). (Emphasis
added).
We could describe the DDSC organizational structure as
follows. Vertically (hierarchically), it is divided into two
units: The Management Unit (Unidad de Gerencia), dealing with
administrative and planning issues, and the Assistance Unit
(Sub-gerencia), dealing with the implementation of the prog-
rams defined by the Management Unit. Each unit is divided
into sub-units. The Management Unit has two sub-units: Admi-
nistration and Planning. The Assistance Unit has five sub-
units in charge of implementation of programs developed at the
Planning Sub-unit of the Management Unit (Educational Develop-
ment, Communication and Cultural Development, Social Urban
Promotion, Sports and Recreation, and Documentation and
Libraries).
The Social Urban Promotion Sub-unit, in particular, is
responsible for the "promotion and creation of grass-roots
organizations in the marginal communities, with the active
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participation of the inhabitants" (70). This sub-unit, as the
implementation body, and the Planning Sub-unit (Divisi6n
de Formulaci6n y Control de Proyectos) are the two areas of
CVG more closely involved in the two programs considered in
this paper, and include the personnel which is in closer
relation to the community organizations.
Now that almost all of CVG's offices are in Ciudad
Guayana, we could find within this institution two kinds of
conflicts in the approach and perception of reality. The
first of them is the potential conflict between divisions.
Each of the divisions, as their names suggest, view reality
from different professional backgrounds, and thus, are "defen-
ding" the interests of the institution in different areas of
action, and it would not be strange to find conflicts, for
example, between the Division of Social and Cultural Develop-
ment, that has to directly face the communities' demands, and
the Division of Real Estate, that has to optimize the economic
use of the land and the infrastructure according to the ideal
of "new industrial city" under which the institution was
created.
The second kind of potential conflict is the one among
the different levels of decision-making, that is, between
those officials who are "in the office", making the "big
decisions" and the planning, and those who are in the field,
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who have to be facing the immediate operational decisions
every day, and who depend upon the "big decisions" of the
former. In brief, this type of potential conflict is what we
called in the previous chapter "the reproduction of the old
'Caracas-site' dichotomy".
When such conflicts acquired a critical character (that
is what we might think happened in the case of Colinas), the
solution was to substitute a more "rational", "objective",
"technical" device for implementation (as a private enter-
prise, supposedly politically neutral), for the possibly too-
involved representative of the institution.
Other institutions:
Two other institutions are directly involved in the
process of implementation of the relocation of Colinas de
Unare: The National Institute of Housing (INAVI), and the
National Institute for Workers Training and Education (INCE).
As we have said in previous sections, the role of the INAVI
was to build certain number of houses, giving easy payment
conditions, and to give "popular credits" for the payment of
construction materials by the relocated families.
INCE, as we have also briefly commented, advised CVG in
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the implementation of the first training course at the UD-293,
and, later, signed a contract with CVG, commiting itself to
provide training to a bigger group of the relocated families.
The contract INCE-CVG was signed in February 24, 1982.
Through it, INCE took the responsibility to plan, coordinate
and implement the training courses for the future inhabitants
of the UD-293 who wanted to self-build their houses. There
would be three types of courses: On "cement floors", on
"brick walls", and on "plaster application". INCE would take
care of buying, transporting, storing and distributing the
necessary materials. On the other hand, CVG would pay for the
actual cost of the course, would decide the lots that would
be subject to self-help construction, would provide for vigi-
lance and the needed emergency costs, and would pay a subsidy
of 30 Bolivares/day to each of the participants in the cour-
ses, who would also be selected by the CVG, after a process of
promotion of the program. The contract did not touch the
point of the criteria for the selection of the participants.
As we can see, this program worked as a way for the
participants to build their own houses, as a way to get
construction skills, and also as a temporary source of income.
However, (a) the lack of explicit criteria for the selection
of the beneficiaries of the program could, again, mean less
control over irregularities in the distribution of such bene-
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fits; (b) beyond the possibility of constructing their own
house--which, of course, is an important achievement--, there
is not any predictible way in which such skills can be profi-
tably applied, except in the informal sector.
The Municipal Council and its special housing agency,
FUNVICA (Fundacion de la Vivienda del Distrito Caron!), are
conspicuously absent in the whole process; they are supposed
to have competence on these issues, and, especially, to have a
direct relation with the functioning of the neighborhood asso-
ciations. This absence reinforces the idea that CVG is in-
creasing its emphasis upon urban issues, while, as its power-
ful and "paternalistic" role has always implied, excluding
other important actors (potentially conflictive ones) from the
management of the problems of the city.
The neighborhood associations:
The Law of Municipal Regime of Venezuela, promulgated
in 1978, considered one form of community organization through
which different neighborhoods can formally discuss their pro-
blems and articulate their demands to the government. Those
organizations, the "neighborhood associations" (asociaciones
de vecinos), came to institutionalize the role fulfilled be-
fore by the asociaciones, in the middle class "urbanizaciones"
and the comitss de barrios in low income and squatter-settle-
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ments' communities. Their creation also eases the access
of government guidelines to the grass-roots, as well as its
control over the latter, since the neighborhood associations
are, in the end, organizations conceived by the government
and acting within the frame of government institutions.
This kind of organization model promoted by the go-
vernment could fit into what Castells (71) calls "controlled
popular mobilization", whose implications will be commented
later.
In this particular case-study, as described in the
documents, we have noted the sudden transformation of the
community organizations from a form that evidenced an open
conflict with the State, to one that apparently collaborated
with it in the achievement of goals mainly defined by the
latter. Two interconnected factors might have caused that:
(a) The strategy followed by the State, and (b) the pre-
vailing party-affiliation in the two neighborhood associa-
tions.
With respect to the first issue, the former attempt to
totally dislodge the population generated an open conflict
between CVG and the community, which could overcome the diver-
gence among member's particular interests, and generate a
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strong movement. Following this, the CVG changed its strate-
gy, approaching the population, and very probably making use
of members of the community clearly tied to the party in
power, to achieve a collaborative attitude.
With respect to the second issue (party-affiliation),
we saw that there existed a coincidence in that the lower-
Colinas de Unare community, being the more physically-stable,
was tied to the party in government, and was the one left
untouched in the site. The upper-Colinas de Unare, on the
contrary, was related to leftist groups and was the one sub-
ject to dislocation. How much the decision of dislocation was
related to purely technical factors, and how much was it
related to the political ties of the two communities, is a
first issue. Whether the physical instability, and thus,
higher risk to dislocation, made it easy for more radical
groups to establish roots in the upper-Colinas de Unare, is a
second issue. However, with respect to this,a CVG official
stated that CVG had contracted a group called "Center for
Popular Formation" (CFP), constituted by community leaders
advised by an autonomous institution with progressive orienta-
tion called "Centro al Servicio de la Acci6n Popular" (CESAP),
and that this group was in charge of creating the base for
community organization in upper-Colinas de Unare. Later,
possibly noticing that this kind of organization could get
out of hand, CVG stopped the process by ending its contract
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with the CFP. This last element shows a a case in which a
supposed process of "controlled popular mobilization" can--
against government will-- be generating an autonomous mobili-
zation; this can be due to government's inability to fulfill
by itself the organization process, having to rely on groups
that, unexpectedly, might have different aims (like the CFP).
Mobilization through the COPEI-affiliates, on the other hand,
seems to have been more fruitful to the CVG.
3.9. Some opinions of CVG officials about the develop-
ment of the program of Colinas de Unare
Besides the way the institution approached the problem
and implemented "the solution", the opinions of the CVG mem-
bers about achievements, failures, and perspectives of the
program of Colinas de Unare might help to identify the values,
criteria and assumptions that underlie CVG's approach towards
the low income communities in Ciudad Guayana. In the follo-
wing paragraphs, the "good" aspects, "bad" aspects, and recom-
mendations of some CVG officials related to the program are
summarized.
"Positive" aspects of the program:
CVG officials place the most important value of the
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Colinas de Unare program on its ability to create social
integration through community participation. The fact that
the initial conflict was channeled and turned into a sort of
political "success" for the CVG--since the process was deve-
loped with no need of violence--is the major achievement
highlighted by CVG officials.
Values such as private property as a base for social
security, and "hard" work as the means to acquire the right to
live in the city, charged with a sense of conventional morali-
ty, were supported as motivations for the participation of the
community.
The person in charge of the CVG office at the UD-293
considered that the relocation of the community of upper-
Colinas
... Constituted, for those families, one of the most
transcendental events in relation to social security,
since having their own land lots, provided with social
services, stimulates them to build by their own effort
a hygienic house, and only then they could feel that
their long period of instability has finished... (72).
...What initially was a problem became an interesting
experience of urban upgrading [?] through a participato-
ry process of community self-management... (73).
... [This process prooves that] applying with good sense
the political concept of Community Development (e.g.,
the convergence of the needs that constitute a social
problematic and the genuine attempt of the State to tend
te popular~mands), adequate solutions to real and
felt needs could be reached... (74).
(Emphasis added).
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The "negative" aspects of the program, as viewed
by the CVG:
One of the critiques of the program was that it was
never a consistent, well-organized, continuous process. The
chief of the local office of CVG at the UD-293, in one of its
reports, stresses this incremental, emergency- character of
the program; indirectly, he attributes it to the lack of a
fluent communication between levels at the CVG, and to the
sudden change of policy of the CVG with respect to the barrio,
which generated unexpected demands to the institution. He
also indicated that this character makes it very difficult to
carry on a full, comprehensive evaluation of achievements
(75).
The second critique is related to the administrative
inefficiency in running the program. Pinelly talks about (a)
administrative rigidity that hinders the implementation of
quick solutions in case of emergency; (b) lack of "clever"
and on-time decision-making at the adequate levels in the CVG,
which had required that many decisions were finally taken "in
the field", creating confusion and lack of coordination in the
decision-making process; (c) the unexpected and informal
participation of INAVI, which ignored all the agreements be-
tween the community and the CVG; (d) the bureaucratism and
"emotional-bias" of administrative processes at CVG which also
damaged the decision-making process; and (e) the irregular
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functioning of the inter-divisional committee of CVG. In sum,
Pinelly, the person in charge of the program in the field,
complains about the absolute divorce from, and lack of support
of the "higher" levels of the institution, to his actions and
demands. His complaints are mostly oriented towards problems
of efficiency of the system above him (again, a reproduction
of the feeling of "painful inaccessibility to power" that was
mentioned in the case of the dichotomy Caracas-site). However,
we could also consider that the nature of the sources of
information--official reports--might hide other complaints
related to the approach and assumptions of higher levels of
decision. Pinelly also notes that the lower-income families
were still living at Colinas de Unare in August 1982, and
they were being heavily affected by the changes in the area
caused by the relocation of their neighbors. Pinelly sugges-
ted quick solutions that would be difficult to implement, due
to the financial inability of these families.
The director of the DDSC, on the other hand, talked
very generally about "political factors involved in the pro-
gram" as causes of problems.
What was never questioned in the documents or inter-
views was the base of the concept of participation utilized by
the institution: As long as it implied a smooth flow of
information on community demands and a certain level of commu-
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nity mobilization around specific goals, it was considered an
ideal one.
Recommendations:
The main recommendations made by the CVG officials for
the future actions of the institution with respect to Colinas
de Unare are summarized as follows:
1.- ... [To] reinforce the team dealing with technical and
social issues, in order to strengthen the activities of
training and socio-cultural promotion, and to stimu-
late new coexistence habits which are adapted to the
requirements of the planned city..." (76).
Again, adjustment of the people to the planning process
is the goal. In addition to that, "dis-adjustment" is viewed
as an educational issue rather than an issue relative to the
segregating, exclussive character of the industrial develop-
ment of Ciudad Guayana (and the country).
2.- To avoid, by means of physical elimination and pre-
vention, the settlement of new families in the vacant barracks
or lots whose former occupants have been relocated (77).
3.- The local official of CVG at the UD-293 showed his
preoccupation about the contracting of a private enterprise,
in 1982, to manage the technical and social problems that he
had been managing until that moment. He recommended to higher
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levels of decision at CVG, to allow him to advise the private
enterprise, at least until its members could get a complete
idea of the history and implications of the program. It is
curious how CVG attempted to delegate its responsibility on
the program to a private entity, generally viewed in Venezuela
as more "objective" and efficient than a government-related
institution as CVG.
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IV.- THE PROGRAM OF TRAINING IN ARTISAN PRODUCTION
OF THE "DEMOSTRADORAS DEL HOGAR"
In contrast to the program of relocation of Colinas de
Unare, which was a quick intervention upon what CVG considered
as an emergency situation, the program of the "Demostradoras
del Hogar" (DH) has been a continuous intervention with long-
term goals; it has been part of the actions of the Division of
Social and Cultural Development (former Division of Human
Development) almost since CVG was founded. The analysis of
its goals, methodologies, achievements and changes over time
will also help us build an image of the values, criteria and
motivations that move the CVG in dealing with the low
income population of Ciudad Guayana.
The information mainly comes from interviews with
the "Demostradoras" themselves, in February, 1983. This sec-
tion of the paper, like the one on Colinas de Unare, being
only based on institutional data and opinions, does not pre-
tend to be a comprehensive one. Certain "conclusions" will be
only hypothetical, their proof depending on further research
about people's perceptions of the program.
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4.1. General definition of the program
Through the program of the DH, the residents of low
income communities in Ciudad Guayana are approached by a team
of Social Workers ("Demostradoras del Hogar"), who help in
organizing such communities around the search for the solution
to certain community problems (which are the ones defined by
CVG, sometimes after community request), or around the imple-
mentation of certain educational and health programs of CVG.
The program has, currently, four areas:
a) Health, through which the participants from the communities
receive information about current health programs being
diffused in the region or the country;
b) "Comunidad Educativa" (Educational Community), a program
through which the community of the barrio receives the
school building to be managed, mantained and used according
to the community's criteria and needs (guaranteeing, at
the same time, lower costs for the CVG);
c) "Asociaci6n de Vecinos" (Neighborhood Associations) , the
program through which the neighbors from a certain barrio
receive all the information and training needed in order to
establish the kind of neighborhood organizations that allow
them, through the law, to articulate their demands to
different levels of government (we talked about them ex-
tensively in relation to the program of Colinas de Unare);
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and
d) Artisan Production and Handcr which is, out of all
of the above, the program of the DH that directly and
explicitly attempts to affect the economic patterns of the
families. This program that trains women, predominantly
housewives, in the barrios, enabling them to produce cer-
tain kinds of goods, is the one to be considered in the
present paper.
4.2. Objectives
We have seen, in the case of Colinas de Unare, how CVG
officials at different levels could hold conflicting views,
due to their different roles in, and closeness to the actual
implementation of the programs. Since it was not possible
during the visit to Ciudad Guayana to find documents which
explained the goals of the program in a "formal" way, it was
necessary to find out about that matter through the personal
interviews.
For the Assistant to the Director of the Division of
Social and Cultural Development of CVG, a person who is re-
lated to the definition of the general goals of the Division,
and thus, who could have a clear idea of the role of this
program within the general process of social and economic
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development of the city--as viewed by CVG--the objective of
this program was
... to generate additional income for the poor families
in Ciudad Guayana, in a direct way (by the production of
goods that could be sold), and in an indirect way (by
helping in building new patterns of consumption and
family organization that would imply economies for the
family)... (78).
When asked about the goals of the program, the team
actually dealing with the daily implementation of the program
answered that the main goal of it was related to the "organi-
zation of the community", and that it was a "point of entry
for other programs into the community" (79). It is important
to note that, either because of different kinds of professio-
nal formation, or because of the different perspectives on the
program, acquired through a different kind of participation in
it, these two different interviewees expressed different
goals. They show that, at the "planning" level, the economic
benefits are being stressed and publicized, while at the
"implementation" level the primary goal would be the creation
of an organizational base to introduce other programs. These
goals are not necessarily opposed or mutually exclusive; in
fact, both could be valid objectives for such a program.
However, if the "Demostradoras" do not consider the economic
goal as an important one, due to their particular professional
formation, or to other reasons, it means that possibly it is
not being pushed for or achieved. That does constitute a
conflict--one more--between what is planned in the offices of
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CVG and what is happening in the city. With respect to the
expressed goals themselves, we could say that
a) "Generating additional income for the families" would
require not only training, but the creation of the ne-
cessary production and marketing structure that enabled the
participants to actually generate some surplus;
b) The institution seemed to be, again, trying to modify
"consumption and organization patterns", supposedly in
accordance to implicit values and concepts of what a typi-
cal Ciudad Guayana's family should be. Statements simmilar
to this were observed in the documents about Colinas de
Unare;
c) Also as in the previous case-study, building the base
for a community organization that complements the action of
the institution at the grass-roots, is a central goal of
the CVG. This reinforces the idea that the institution
supports the model of "controlled popular mobilization" as
a way to deal with low income communities and to implement
programs at that level.
4.3. Outreach method
The outreach method has changed since the program was
first implemented. While at the beginning the social workers
-- then called "promotoras", promoters--entered the communities
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through their already established organizations, the neighbor-
hood associations, for example, the method now is to reach
the potential participants through direct diffusion, "house by
house". The shift from the "collective" approach to the "indi-
vidual" approach is interesting for the present study. When
compared to the Colinas, it reflects the fact that CVG "utili-
zation" of the mass organizations does not follow a general
pattern: It seems to depend highly on the particular level of
politicization, party-affiliation and type of problem present
in each community. Even though it is known that certain
community organizations keep collaborating with the difussion
and implementation of the program, one of the interviewees
talked about the existence of certain "political" problems in
the implementation of the program: A neighborhood association
has been in conflict with the promoters of the program (in the
UD-123).
Another curious point is that no general diffussion
campaign has been carried on. The program has been applied to
roughly the same barrios since it was first implemented. One
of the possible reasons is that the program has created a
certain infrastructure and demand in those barrios, which
justify not leaving them; on the other hand, the evident
resource scarcity impedes the expansion of the program to
other barrios. This could also explain the lack of explicit
criteria for the selection of the barrios to be subject to
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this program. In some sense, the constraints imposed by
"reality" determine both an inertial and a non-systematic
functioning of the program.
In the "house by house" promotion of the program, the
Demostradoras del Hogar present to the women of the barrio a
list of all the available courses; the participants decide on
the type of course they would like to attend, and the sche-
dules; the courses are usually given either at the headquar-
ters of a mass organization, in the school of the barrio, or
in the house of one of the participants.
4.4. Incidence upon social and economic organizations
Since the end of 1982, the program has been implemented
in three different manners, to three different kinds of
groups:
- Group A: This group is formed by the "new" participants,
those who are taking the courses for the first
time; they can be guided either by the Demostrado-
ras themselves or by the so-called "multiplying
agents" (MA), who are those participants of pre-
vious courses that have acquired certain skills,
and are willing to dictate courses to
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- Group B:
- Group C:
their neighbors.
This type of group is formed by the MA themselves;
they receive special preparation that enables them
to give courses to other beginning groups.
Formed by women that are reached through the
schools where their children study. In some
cases, instead of reaching the beneficiaries di-
rectly, through the "house by house" method, the
Demostradoras contact the school organizations,
the "educational communities", and prepare courses
to be given in the schools buildings to the
mothers of the children in those schools.
From the above paragraphs, we have seen that the pro-
gram has begun to change its own structure by incorporating in
its team (under different conditions than those enjoyed by the
Demostradoras, however) those outstanding and economically-
able participants who manifested their interest in promoting
and implementing the courses. The program has also begun to
generate certain forms of organization that attempt to
transcend the scope of the training courses (this would be
consistent with the goals expressed by the Demostradoras).
Since February 1982, the MA started organizing themselves,
under CVG advise, into the so-called "Comitss Femeninos" (Wo-
men's Committees); they are composed of eight to ten women by
barrio. These "women's committees" organize courses for the
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MA, promote the program among the community, establish inter-
relations with other committees from other barrios, and sup-
port other kinds of organizations, generally promoted by CVG,
as well (e.g., the educational committees and the health
committees). We can see, then, how the training programs
become a device for organizing the community "from above".
In terms of the economic organization generated by this
program, it was only in mid-1982 that an initiative was taken
to give some formal structure to the production processes
developed by the participants in the courses. Before that,
only individual participants, supported by their own "entre-
preneurial" skills and their relatively better economic situa-
tion within the community, could start production enterprises.
In mid-1982, an attempt was made to create what is called
"pre-units" of production: Those women that could afford to
do it (and that was actually a condition, since no economic
help is being given to those pre-units yet) joined small
production groups, and began to produce these kindsof goods
that they learnt to produce in the courses. The production
takes place in the house of one of the members of the pre-
unit, with the materials and resources available in their
pockets. Each one of these groups is formed by an average of
five women; there are already eight groups of this sort in
Ciudad Guayana.
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In addition to the fact that the production pre-units
are not given any economic support by CVG, there is also a
lack of preparation in terms of marketing and administration
of the production. The first element implies that only those
women whose families' economic situation is relatively better-
off would be able to participate in the pre-units of pro-
duction, since these production activities require a certain
amount of investment taken from the consumption resources of
the family, and, also, are absorbing the labor of the women
who are participating in them. The second element implies
that the bargaining power of such production units in the
market, as well as the surplus that the participants can
receive from this process, are quite small. Thus, even
though, recently, efforts have been made to give an
"economic appeal" to the program through the creation of these
pre-units, we could conclude that the program is not really
providing the necessary channels for the participants to gene-
rate a significant income for their families. This fact is
opposed to the goal expressed by the Assistant to the Director
of the DDSC of CVG. From what we have said until now, we
could conclude that the program of the Demostradoras del
Hogar, while attempting to affect the patterns of organization
of the community in order to adapt them to the fulfillment of
the goals that the institution has, is not providing the
participants with instruments to reinforce their economic
situation (or it is providing those instruments in a
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differential and selective way, meaning that the program could
be reinforcing economic differentiations in the barrios).
4.5. Subjects
The goods that the participants of these courses are
taught to produce are: Clothes, cakes, design on material,
dolls, christmas ornaments, cards, "guajiro"-style tapestry,
shoes, ceramics, flower ornaments, Venezuelan dishes, "pina-
tas", decorated cushions.
The total number of participants for 1980 was 1057,
distributed into 51 courses, given in barrios of Puerto Ordaz
and San Felix. In 1982, the figures grew to 69 courses given
to a total of 1458 persons. In 1982, the figures were:
approximately 2300 persons and 93 groups. During this last
year, there was a significant increase in the number of parti-
cipants--even though, as it can be seen, the rate of partici-
pants per course decreased; this fact might be due to the
introduction of the MA, which made possible the proliferation
of courses. The number of production pre-units was eight,
involving approximately 40 women. The groups were dedicated
to the production of: Cakes (two pre-units), dolls (one),
design on cloth (one), "pifiatas"(one) , ceramics (two), and
knitting (one).
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The Director of the DDSC of CVG declared that he consi-
dered that the courses were not collaborating on the change of
the "inadequate food habits" of the families, since the main
emphasis in the cooking courses was put on foods rich in
carbo-hidrates, a typical problem in Venezuelan diet, and also
since the majority of the other products were not basic ones
(80). On the other hand, these courses seem to be the ones
which the inhabitants of the barrios demand the most, possibly
because of lack of knowledge about alternatives. In any case,
it can be observed that most of the goods produced are not
income-inelastic or basic ones, so its marketing possibilities
within the barrios are dubious. Only some of them are sup-
posed to be advantageously produced at such an small scale;
however, the lack of adequate connections for the acquisition
of the raw materials at lower prices makes it difficult for
these potential producers to offer goods at attractive costs.
Their only advantage, that is, the particular characteristic
of being "unique", hand-made, is affected by the stereo-typed
methods that the participants are taught.
4.6. Personnel
The group implementing the program of artisan produc-
tion of the DH, is formed by one coordinator (Ms. Elina de
Rey), a Social Worker, and four "Demostradoras". The prepara-
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tion of the latter consist on a special training at the level
of high-school in one of the two vocational schools that train
this type of professional in Venezuela, and that are located
significantly far from Ciudad Guayana. In addition to this
team, we have noted already the presence of the MA, which were
approximately five by each Demostradora, by February 1983.
The Demostradoras, as it has seen already said, are not
subjected to any kind of training on marketing and administra-
tion. CVG made an experimental attempt, contracting a private
institution from Caracas (CESAP, Centro al Servicio de la
Acci6n Popular), in order to train them on organizational and
administrative matters. However, the contract was terminated;
besides the recent creation of the pre-units for production,
no further advance has been experienced on that line.
4.7. Achievements
The main achievement the Demostradoras think they have
reached, besides the training of several thousand women in the
areas the program considers, is "a better level of organiza-
tion of the community, that enables it to generate solutions
for its own problems" (81).
In fact, in a country characterized by the general lack
of identification of the communities with the decision-making,
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this type of programs at least help the community on knowing
some channels through which they might reach such officials.
It does not act effectively, however, in the opposite direc-
tion, that is, leading the decision-makers to modify their
actions according to the communities needs, unless political
stability is under risk. This last assertion can be made in
view of the lack of communication existing even between dif-
ferent levels within the same institution. Furthermore, if
the above possibility of contact of the people with the deci-
sion-making mechanisms is only utilized by the latter in order
to easen the implementation of pre-established goals of the
institution and the system in general--which we have seen is
actually what the institution is seeking for, without
attaching any negative value to such an intention--these
types of programs will hardly have any possitive result in
terms of generating autonomous social mobilization. This last
goal must be searched for from without the government institu-
tions.
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FINAL OBSERVATIONS
The relationship between the state and the popular
sectors--the low-income, in many cases squatter-settling com-
munities in dependent-capitalist urban centers--has become a
critical one, given the increasing size of those sectors and
their increasing ability to articulate their demands in a
concrete political form. The state's conception of, and ap-
proach to, such a relationship has assumed several forms, from
one guided by "humanitarian" motivations, trying to improve
the living standards of the population without looking at its
deeper causes, to one which recognizes the revolutionary--or,
at least, conflictual--potential of such groups, attempting to
channel and coopt popular experiences in terms of autonomous
organization. This paper has presented two cases that illus-
trate how the relationship state-low-income-communities is
taking place in a new industrial city: Ciudad Guayana.
The increasing lack of control of the Corporaci6n
Venezolana de Guayana over the major economic programs on
which the growth center of Ciudad Guayana was based has
determined a shift in the emphasis of its interventions
towards its second area of action: The management of the
regional and urban settings related to the growth pole, that
is, the Guayana Region and Ciudad Guayana. This change means
moving from dealing with supposedly nationally-oriented
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interests, which by the 1960's were tied to a developmentalist
ideal of economic growth and modernization (technocratically
considered to be on the "public interest"), to the regional
and--specially--local levels, e.g., basically dealing with
social issues. For the state, "dealing with social issues" in
Ciudad Guayana involves, as a very important component of its
interventions, dealing with the growing low income, squatter
settlers' sector.
What has the shift in emphasis of CVG functions implied
in terms of its interventions towards low income communities?
From the case-studies, it seems that it has meant very little
in terms of changing the ideology underlying such interven-
tions. The case-studies show how CVG keeps thinking of
squatter settlers as traditional, disintegrated rural
immigrants whose behavior patterns ought to be changed in
order for them to match the dynamics of the modern, industrial
city, approach that has been extensively documented against,
and whose main counter-argument arises from the observation of
barrios in Ciudad Guayana (82). The institutions goals with
respect to social development are supported on that
subordination of human issues to the requirements of economic
growth.
In a system where the state cannot support its actions
any more (or solely...) by means of force, the manipulation
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of popular organization through its key points (as shown in
the case of the Demostradoras) becomes important. As a
result, it also seems that that shift towards a more explicit
socio-political action has coincided with a slight change in
the means to concretize such an ideology: While CVG keeps
being a dominant and paternalistic piece within the institu-
tional structure in Ciudad Guayana, it tended to change its
clientelistic relationship to low income communities for one
of "controlled popular mobilization", in other words, changing
the role of the community from being a passive and dependent
soliciter, to being an active part in the implementation of
the Corporation's goals. This kind of strategy was exem-
plified in the story about Colinas de Unare. Two factors, the
promulgation of the Law of Municipal Regime in 1978, es-
tablishing the channels for the communities to articulate
their demands at the local level, and the presence of a Chris-
tian-democrat government (1979-1984) flagging the policy of
popular "participation" in the decision-making, might be re-
lated to this new approach.
Castells says about the strategy of controlled popular
mobilization that
... [It] expands the hegemony of the dominant class
[represented by the state] over the popular sectors,
which are organized under the label of "urban mar-
ginals". However, the crisis of this hegemony--if it
takes place--has much more serious consequences over the
prevailing social order than the rupture of the paterna-
listic linkages of a traditional political machine-
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ry...(83). (Emphasis added).
What the perspectives and effects of State
interventions would be in the case of Guayana, which form is
such an "hegemony" taking, and the likelihood of its crisis,
are issues that go beyond the scope of the present paper, and
which would be very interesting topics for further research.
After observing CVG actions and criticizing the
consistent realization of an ideology that tends to reinforce
the inequality in the allocation of resources, one question
arises: What could we have expected the CVG to do, that would
have implied the achievement of a "better" result? Another
question arises: What can we consider to -be a "better"
result?
According to CVG own objectives and CVG reports, the
two studied programs might be considered political successes
with some technical failures. The case of Colinas de Unare
shows that CVG structure has the level of flexibility needed
to absorb community demands and to integrate community
organizations into the attempt of achieving the institution's
goals. In the case of the Demostradoras, CVG is also
channeling the energies of a potentially conflicting sector
of the population--the "housewives", those who, in a culture
like Venezuelan, have to deal directly with the increasing
problems of housing, social services and home economy--into
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the creation of social networks that easen the implementation
of government campaigns. Improvements, according to CVG
members, should take place at the administrative level, and in
the relations between different spheres of decision within the
CVG (in the case of Colinas de Unare), and in the mechanisms
to insure economic efficiency (in the case of the pre-units of
production created by the Demostradoras).
However, if the goal is to reach community
organizations that really reflect and express the diverse
interests within the communities, and to have institutions
that are able to provide them with the instruments to
prioritizeand realize such interests, and that are also able
to reach a balance between national and local interests, then
the two stories presented here show that CVG is far from
reaching--even from considering--that goal. Now, the solution
may not even be possible within the general social, political,
economic conditions present in Venezuela. What the limits of
a system like Venezuela's are, and how much can be achieved
through plain reforms, are other "big" issues underlying a
study like this.
Finally, with respect to the case-studies, there are
some lines of research that should be followed, some questions
whose answer can help build a more comprehensive view of
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actual CVG interventions and their impacts. In the first
place, as we have been saying along the paper, it would be
necessary to make field research on how different actors
within the affected communities view the development of both
programs. From such a research, we might have a completely
different image of what the programs have meant in practice.
In the second place, it would be interesting to evaluate the
real impacts of the programs both in terms of the goals set by
the CVG, and in terms of the goals assumed in this paper as
desirable (this latter criteria point might need more elabora-
tion). In the third place--at a lower, implementation level--
it would also be interesting to observe the performance of the
private enterprise contracted by the CVG to deal with the case
of Colinas de Unare, and to evaluate its economic, social and
political costs.
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APPENDIX 1:
Graph 1: Ciudad Guayana: Location
Graph 2: Ciudad Guayana: Sectors of the City and Activites
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APPENDIX 2:
Table 1: Ciudad Guayana: Total Population Classified by Age-
Groups and Sector (April 1980)
Table 2: Ciudad Guayana: Percentage of the Population 15
Years or Older who are Unemployed and who are
Working in Construction (1968-1980)
Table 3: Ciudad Guayana: Type of Buildings by Sectors of the
City (October 1979)
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TABLE No.1: Ciudad Guayana: Total Population Classified bi Age-Groups
and Sector (AprilT1980)
TOTAL* AGE GROUPS**
0 - 4 5 - 14 15 - 24 25 - 64 65 +
TOTAL Abs. 339,800 58,177 96,611 67,182 112,311 5,539
C.G.
% 100.0 17.12 28.43 19.77 33.05 1.63
Puerto Abs. 98,607 15,764 23,733 18,312 39,367 1,431
Ordaz
Matanzas % 15.99 24.07 18.57 39.92 1.45
San Abs. 241,213 42,413 72.878 48,870 72,944 4,108
FGlix
% 17.59 30.21 20.26 30.24 1.7
1 
lW
* Percentage of
** Percentage of
each sector relative to the total of
each age-group relative to the total
the city.
in the sector.
Source: Survey of Employment and Unemployment (Households), CVG, DEPI.
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TABLE No. 2: Ciudad Guayana. Percentage of the Population
(15 Years or Older) Unemployed and of the
Populat~ion i~Years or Older in the Constructifon
Sector (1968-1980)
Source: Maria Pilar Garcia: La Guayana V
de Desarrollo, Caracas, USB, 1983.
enezolana como Polo
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Month/Year % Unemployed % Population Working In
Population Construction Industry
July 1968 18.4 9.2
July 1969 10.3 13.0
July 1970 14.0 13.5
July 1971 9.6 12.1
July 1972 12.7 10.7
July 1973 11.1 11.5
March 1974 13.1 9.5
July 1975 10.3 11.9
April 1976 6.9 17.7
April 1977 3.3 24.7
April 1978 4.4 24.1
April 1979 5.2 24.1
April 1980 6.8 16.1
TABLE No. 3: CIUDAD GUAYANA: Buildings and "Ranchos" by
Sector of the City (October 1979)
Total #
Buildings
# of
Ranchos
Ciudad Abs. 74,088 18,086
Guayana % 100.0 24.4
San Abs. 48,273 16,252
FMlix % 65.2 89.9
Puerto Abs. 25,815 1,834
Ordaz % 34.8 10.1
Source: Buildings
May 1982.
and Services Survey, CVG - DEPI.
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APPENDIX 3:
Graph 3: Area of Action of CVG: 1960-1969
Graph 4: Area of Action of CVG: 1969-1983
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APPENDIX 4:
Organizational Charts of the CVG
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